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Administrative	Learning	or	Political	Blaming?	Public	Servants,	Parliamentary	Committees	
and	the	Drama	of	Public	Accountability.	
By	Dennis	C.	Grube	
...in	our	system	a	political	minister	must	face	the	music	in	parliament;	that	is	his	duty	
and	his	privilege.		He	must	take	responsibility	for	his	department	and	its	
administration...Civil	servants	ought	not	to	be	dragged	into	parliamentary	debate...it	
would	be	deplorable	to	have	their	names	and	views	bandied	about	in	Parliament,	
thus	involving	the	civil	servant	much	against	his	will	in	party	political	controversy.	
Sir	Robert	Menzies	(1970,	151-152)		
	
In	1970,	former	Australian	Prime	Minister	Sir	Robert	Menzies	published	a	series	of	political	
essays	-	The	Measure	of	the	Years	–	in	which	he	warned	against	any	moves	to	draw	public	
servants	into	a	more	direct	type	of	parliamentary	accountability.		His	argument	that	public	
servants	should	not	be	called	before	parliamentarians	and	compelled	to	answer	questions	
re-stated	what	were	considered	fundamentals	of	the	Westminster	system.		Ministers,	not	
public	servants,	provided	the	public	face	of	government.		The	doctrine	of	ministerial	
responsibility	required	ministers	to	answer	to	parliament	and	the	public	for	the	
administration	of	their	departments.		Under	the	traditional	public	service	bargain,	a	
permanent	and	non-partisan	public	service	would	loyally	and	anonymously	carry	out	the	
wishes	of	the	government	of	the	day	(see	Hondeghem	2011).		It	was	not	their	job	to	publicly	
answer	for	policy	outcomes	–	good	or	bad	(Mulgan	2002:	47).	
	 Things	have	changed.		In	part	through	their	appearances	in	front	of	parliamentary	
committees,	contemporary	public	service	leaders	have	become	part	of	the	public	face	of	
modern	government	(see	Weller	2001:	150-4;	Mulgan	2012).		Through	processes	like	the	
annual	Senate	Estimates	hearings	in	Australia	(see	Mulgan	2008)	opposition	politicians	now	
probe	for	ways	to	embarrass	ministers	by	embarrassing	the	public	servants	who	serve	them.		
Under	the	pressures	of	a	24/7	news	cycle,	media	outlets	use	the	testimony	of	public	
servants	as	part	of	their	reporting	of	government	performance.		Public	servants	who	were	
once	the	anonymous	instruments	of	democratically	elected	governments	have	become	yet	
another	player	in	the	very	public	blame	games	that	characterize	the	processes	of	modern	
governance.	
	 Many	appearances	before	parliamentary	committees	display	elements	of	drama,	
involving	‘clashes’	between	public	servants	and	MPs	that	are	then	amplified	by	being	
reported	in	the	press.		In	pursuing	a	form	of	accountability	that	is	both	public	and	dramatic,	
legislatures	across	the	Westminster	world	have	created	the	conditions	in	which	public	
servants	can	find	themselves	drawn	into	the	very	‘party	political	controversies’	that	Menzies	
was	warning	against.		Accountability,	and	the	form	it	should	take,	is	an	inherently	contested	
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concept	that	means	different	things	in	different	contexts	(Bovens	et	al	2008;	‘t	Hart	and	
Wille	2006).		One	stream	in	the	literature	suggests	that	public	accountability	mechanisms	
should	provide	the	conditions	for	bureaucratic	‘learning’,	encouraging	best	practice	public	
administration	for	the	future	(Bovens	et	al	2008;	Aucoin	and	Heintzman	2000).		Bovens	et	al	
argue	that	the	characteristics	of	a	‘learning’	type	of	accountability	in	a	public	accountability	
setting	have	to	encourage	reflection	and	debate,	but	in	a	‘safe’	environment	where	people	
can	be	open	without	fearing	the	consequences	(Boven	et	al	2008:	233).			
This	paper	examines	the	elements	of	drama	inherent	in	parliamentary	committee	
questioning	of	public	servants,	and	analyses	whether	the	nature	of	the	setting	encourages	
or	inhibits	opportunities	for	a	‘learning’	type	of	accountability.		The	paper	is	driven	by	two	
core	research	questions:	
1. Which	elements	of	‘dramaturgy’	are	present	in	the	appearance	of	public	servants	before	
parliamentary	committees,	and	what	effect	do	they	have?	
2. Does	the	setting	of	parliamentary	appearances	facilitate	‘learning’	accountability	or	does	
it	encourage	blame	avoidance	behaviour?	
	
Dramaturgy	Theory	and	‘Blame	Game’	Theory	
There	is	a	strong	and	still	developing	literature	on	the	ways	in	which	policymaking	
processes	can	be	seen	and	understood	as	‘dramaturgy’	(‘t	Hart	1993;	Hajer	2005a,	2005b,	
2006;	Freeman	and	Peck	2007;	Peck	et	al	2009).		Hajer’s	series	of	articles	in	the	area	argue	
that	the	dramaturgy	of	policymaking	contains	all	the	aspects	needed	in	any	meaningful	
piece	of	theatre:	scripting,	staging,	setting	and	performance	(2005a:	631).	Hajer	uses	
dramaturgy	theory	to	examine	the	mixture	of	formal	and	informal	policy	processes	involved	
in	the	making	of	land	use	and	planning	decisions	(e.g.	Hajer	2005a	and	2005b).		But	as	the	
earlier	work	of	Austin	(1962)	and	Edelman	(1964)	demonstrates,	elements	of	symbolism,	
performance	and	dramaturgy	are	present	in	most	political	processes,	and	parliamentary	
committees	are	no	exception.	
In	theory	of	course,	the	public	service	stands	impartially	aside	from	‘political’	
contests.		In	practice,	the	processes	of	public	accountability	before	parliamentary	
committees	insert	public	servants	into	the	middle	of	hotly	contested	political	disputes.		The	
fact	that	these	debates	are	very	much	public	in	nature	can	create	perceptions	of	
engagement	in	political	debate,	even	if	in	reality	public	servants	are	trying	very	hard	to	
avoid	becoming	engaged	(see	Lindquist	and	Rasmussen	2012:	191).		Dramaturgy	theory	
provides	a	different	way	of	examining	the	formalised	accountability	processes	of	
parliamentary	committees	as	political	contests	in	which	there	are	winners	and	losers.		It	
draws	out	the	inherent	tension	between	the	democratic	authority	of	MPs	to	question	the	
executive	and	the	overriding	duty	of	public	servants	to	loyally	support	the	government	of	
the	day.		
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By	seeing	parliamentary	committees	as	a	‘setting’	through	the	lens	of	dramaturgy	
theory,	the	format	of	this	institutionalized	process	of	public	accountability	becomes	more	
apparent.		The	setting	is	inherently	adversarial,	in	which	MPs	adopt	the	role	of	interrogators	
of	public	servants	who	are	presumed	to	be	withholding	vital	information	from	the	public	
about	the	failures	and	missteps	of	the	government.		It’s	a	performance	in	which	the	script	is	
constructed	as	an	opportunity	for	the	people’s	representatives	to	discipline	the	people’s	
servants.		Like	students	summoned	to	the	principal’s	office,	public	servants	know	that	they	
are	coming	to	be	scolded	by	their	parliamentary	masters.		When	ministers	appear	before	a	
committee	of	their	fellow	MPs	they	appear	as	equals;	as	democratically	elected	
representatives	themselves	they	have	no	need	to	kowtow.		For	public	servants,	the	power	
dynamic	is	different.		They	are	being	called	before	a	committee	that	is	trying	to	either	attach	
blame	to	them	for	administrative	failures,	or	recruit	them	as	accomplices	to	shift	blame	
onto	the	ministers	that	they	serve.		Under	the	conventions	of	a	Westminster	public	service,	
neither	outcome	is	one	that	public	servants	can	easily	embrace.	
One	of	the	limitations	of	dramaturgy	theory	is	that	it	can’t	reveal	everything	about	
the	institutionalised	factors	that	may	be	driving	the	way	that	actors	interpret	the	part	they	
are	to	play.		A	second	line	of	theory	–	‘blame	game’	theory	–	provides	further	insights	into	
what	public	servants	are	trying	to	achieve	from	their	appearances	before	parliamentary	
committees.		Blame	game	theory	as	derived	from	the	work	of	Christopher	Hood	(2011;	see	
also	Weaver	1986)	suggests	that	looking	at	the	working	of	bureaucracies	through	the	prism	
of	blame	avoidance	can	help	to	explain	the	structure	and	behaviours	of	public	institutions	
and	the	actors	within	them.		Hood	identifies	three	types	of	blame	avoidance	strategy.		These	
are	‘presentational’	strategies	that	are	about	the	spinning	or	framing	of	information	to	
present	it	in	the	best	possible	light;	‘agency’	strategies	that	involve	organizing	a	public	
agency	in	such	a	way	that	responsibility	doesn’t	settle	in	any	one	place	or	on	any	one	
person;	and	‘policy’	strategies	which	see	decision-makers	adhere	to	strict	policy	processes	
that	remove	their	discretion	and	therefore	provide	the	defence	if	something	goes	wrong	
that	they	were	‘just	following	policy’.		Faced	with	the	need	to	deflect	or	parry	blame	
attribution	attempts,	public	servants	appearing	before	parliamentary	committees	embrace	
various	of	these	strategies.				
To	examine	the	workings	of	parliamentary	committees	as	theatrical	vehicles	for	the	
public	attribution	of	blame,	the	paper	asks	three	questions	about	the	appearances	of	public	
servants:		First,	what	are	they	allowed	to	say?		What	are	the	rules	that	govern	appearances	
by	public	servants?		Second,	what	do	they	say?	What	lines	of	questioning	are	employed	by	
committee	MPs	and	are	they	targeting	political	or	administrative	matters?		And	third,	what	
does	the	media	make	of	what	was	said?	How	are	bureaucratic	appearances	portrayed	in	the	
press	–	as	politically-charged	theatre	or	as	part	of	the	normal	business	of	public	
administration?	
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To	analyse	these	questions	through	a	comparative	lens,	the	paper	undertakes	two	
in-depth	case	studies	examining	high	profile	administrative	failures	in	two	countries	–	the	
United	Kingdom	and	Australia.	The	cases	have	been	selected	under	a	‘least	similar’	research	
design	to	create	an	exploratory	analysis	that	will	draw	out	as	wide	a	spectrum	of	behaviours	
as	possible	in	how	public	servants	are	questioned	by	parliamentary	committees.		The	first	
case	is	the	2012-13	inquiry	by	the	Public	Accounts	Committee	(PAC)	in	the	United	Kingdom	
into	the	failed	tender	process	for	the	West	Coast	rail	franchise.		The	PAC	in	the	United	
Kingdom	has	a	long-standing	tradition	of	investigation	of	administrative	failures	in	a	largely	
non-partisan	way.		In	media	coverage	prior	to	the	inquiry,	the	case	had	already	been	widely	
reported	as	a	failure	of	administrative	process	rather	than	political	leadership.		The	second	
case	is	the	2010	inquiry	by	the	Australian	Senate	Standing	Committee	on	the	Environment,	
Communications	and	the	Arts	into	the	Rudd	government’s	Home	Insulation	Program	(HIP).		
Undertaken	in	a	fiercely	partisan	environment	in	an	election	year,	the	Committee	was	split	
along	partisan	lines	and	was	focussed	on	failures	in	political	leadership	rather	than	
administrative	process.	
The	cases	chosen	are	illustrative	of	the	two	ends	of	a	spectrum	on	how	much	
parliamentary	committee	investigations	are	driven	by	administrative	or	political	questions.		
They	are	not	intended	to	be	representative	in	a	country-specific	sense.		In	other	words,	I	do	
not	claim	that	select	committees	in	the	United	Kingdom	always	operate	in	the	way	that	the	
PAC	did	in	the	West	Coast	rail	case,	or	that	Australian	Senate	committees	always	operate	in	
the	way	that	they	did	in	the	HIP	case.		Rather,	the	cases	show	two	distinct	ways	in	which	
committees	can	operate,	illustrating	the	breadth	of	the	spectrum	that	is	available	to	
committees	in	Westminster	systems	in	how	they	choose	to	exercise	parliamentary	oversight	
of	administrative	practice.	
			
The	Rules	–	What	Are	Public	Servants	Allowed	To	Say?	
United	Kingdom	
In	the	United	Kingdom,	the	relevant	guidelines	are	known	colloquially	as	the	‘Osmotherly’	
rules	after	the	civil	servant	who	authored	them	in	the	early	1980s.		The	Osmotherly	rules	–	
like	so	much	of	the	Westminster	system	as	a	whole	–	are	largely	convention-based	and	have	
no	formal	authority.		This	is	acknowledged	in	the	rules	themselves,	which	state	at	the	outset	
that	‘…this	memorandum	is	a	Government	document.	Although	Select	Committees	will	be	
familiar	with	its	contents,	it	has	no	formal	Parliamentary	standing	or	approval,	nor	does	it	
claim	to	have’	(Cabinet	Office	2005:	para.	3).	
In	2012,	the	House	of	Lords	Select	Committee	on	the	Constitution	produced	a	report	
on	the	Accountability	of	Civil	Servants.		The	Committee	examined	the	Osmotherly	rules	in	
detail	and	stressed	that:	‘The	Osmotherly	rules	are	an	executive	document	offering	
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guidance	to	civil	servants—and	no	more.	They	in	no	way	have	the	effect	of	imposing	
restrictions	on	the	activities	of	select	committees’	(House	of	Lords	2012:	para.	70).		As	noted	
by	the	Lords,	under	the	Osmotherly	rules	civil	servants	only	appear	in	front	of	committees	
‘on	behalf	of	their	ministers	and	under	their	directions’	(House	of	Lords	2010:	para.	74;	
Cabinet	Office	2005:	para.	40).		In	other	words,	under	the	doctrine	of	ministerial	
accountability,	civil	servants	are	not	exercising	any	independent	authority	when	appearing	
before	a	committee.		They	are	doing	as	they	are	asked	on	behalf	of	their	legitimate	masters	
–	the	ministers	of	the	day.	
The	difficulty	arises	–	that	whilst	in	theory	civil	servants	appear	with	the	face	of	their	
minister	–	the	public	nature	of	committee	hearings	mean	that	the	media	can	attribute	
public	blame	more	directly	to	them.		This	was	acknowledged	by	Bernard	Jenkin	MP	–	whose	
evidence	was	cited	in	the	Lords’	final	report:	‘The	idea	that	[civil	servants]	are	unfortunate,	
beleaguered	public	servants	who	cannot	speak	for	themselves	is	of	an	era	that	has	passed.	
They	are	being	held,	certainly	by	the	public,	to	be	more	directly	accountable	and	it	would	
seem	odd	if	Parliament	did	not	do	the	same’	(House	of	Lords	2012:	para.	77).		The	
Osmotherly	rules	are	aware	of	the	potential	for	civil	servants	to	be	drawn	into	‘political’	
debate	during	select	committee	appearances,	and	stress	that	‘[o]fficials	should	as	far	as	
possible	avoid	being	drawn	into	discussion	of	the	merits	of	alternative	policies	where	this	is	
politically	contentious’	(Cabinet	Office	2005:	para.	55).		
	
Australia	
The	Australian	guidelines	–	like	the	original	Osmotherly	rules	–	date	from	the	1980’s.		The	
Government	Guidelines	for	Official	Witnesses	Before	Parliamentary	Committees	and	Related	
Matters	provide	guidance	on	both	written	and	oral	evidence,	including	setting	out	the	
limitations	that	apply	to	what	can	legitimately	be	asked	of	public	servants.		Following	the	
Osmotherly	approach,	the	guidelines	begin	by	setting	out	the	broader	principles	that	apply	
in	relation	to	ministerial	responsibility.	
In	the	Australian	system	of	parliamentary	government,	and	consistent	with	the	
traditional	understanding	of	ministerial	responsibility,	the	public	and	parliamentary	
advocacy	and	defence	of	government	policies	and	administration	has	traditionally	
been,	and	should	remain,	the	preserve	of	Ministers,	not	officials.	The	duty	of	the	
public	servant	is	to	assist	ministers	to	fulfil	their	accountability	obligations	by	
providing	full	and	accurate	information	to	the	Parliament	about	the	factual	and	
technical	background	to	policies	and	their	administration.	The	guidelines	are	
therefore	aimed	at	encouraging	the	freest	possible	flow	of	such	information	
between	the	public	service,	the	Parliament	and	the	public.	(Australian	Government	
1989:	para.	1.1).	
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The	guidelines	make	clear	that	‘…officials	should	be	open	with	committees	and	if	
unable	or	unwilling	to	answer	questions	or	provide	information	should	say	so,	and	give	
reasons’	(Australian	Government	1989:	para.	2.19).		Coupled	with	the	underlying	principle	
of	the	‘freest	possible	flow’	of	information,	there	is	a	clear	desire	for	officials	to	speak	
candidly	as	part	of	the	normal	information-sharing	process	that	is	considered	appropriate	in	
a	democracy.	
	 However,	the	guidelines	are	careful	to	express	the	traditional	delineations	required	
of	a	non-partisan	public	service,	which	is	that	witnesses	should	not	engage	with	policy	
opinions	but	stick	to	factual	explanations	about	a	policy	and	how	it	has	been	implemented.		
Submissions	‘should	not	advocate,	defend	or	canvass	the	merits	of	government	policies’	
(Australian	Government	1989:	para.	2.15(a))	but	‘may	describe	those	policies	and	the	
administrative	arrangements	and	procedures	involved	in	implementing	them’	(Australian	
Government	1989:	para.	2.15(b)).		They	‘should	not	identify	considerations	leading	to	
government	decisions	or	possible	decisions,	in	areas	of	any	sensitivity…’	(Australian	
Government	1989:	para.	2.15(c)).	
In	summary,	the	rules	in	the	United	Kingdom	and	Australia	are	largely	the	same,	and	
in	large	part	re-state	the	established	conventions	and	traditions	of	the	Westminster	system.		
Ministers	are	the	accountable	face	of	government.		Public	servants	are	to	provide	facts	but	
not	opinions,	and	if	in	doubt	are	quite	entitled	to	refer	a	committee	back	to	ministers	rather	
than	answering	a	contentious	question	themselves.		But	in	the	Australian	rules	in	particular,	
there	is	also	a	principle	at	play	that	encourages	‘…the	freest	possible	flow	of	such	
information	between	the	public	service,	the	Parliament	and	the	public.’		That	principle	is	in	
itself	something	of	a	departure	from	engrained	Westminster	tradition	because	it	suggests	a	
natural	link	between	the	public	service	and	the	parliament,	rather	than	between	the	elected	
government	and	the	parliament.			
Having	established	what	the	rules	are,	the	next	section	examines	the	realities	of	
practice	to	see	how	the	questioning	of	public	servants	by	parliamentary	committees	is	
actually	functioning	in	a	contemporary	context.	The	key	challenges	in	using	parliament	to	
hold	public	servants	to	account	centre	on	three	aspects	that	the	Osmotherly	rules	and	their	
Australian	equivalent	are	explicitly	or	implicitly	trying	to	avoid.		First,	does	it	contribute	to	
the	perceived	politicization	of	public	servants	by	drawing	them	into	political	debates?		
Second,	does	it	diminish	ministerial	responsibility	by	holding	officials	to	account	rather	than	
democratically	elected	politicians?		And	third,	does	it	actually	aid	in	establishing	
accountability	or	does	it	simply	encourage	the	blame	avoidance	behaviours	identified	by	
Hood	(2011)?		These	three	aspects	are	discussed	below	with	reference	to	the	transcripts	of	
hearings	from	the	United	Kingdom	PAC	on	the	West	Coast	rail	case,	and	the	Australian	
Senate	inquiry	into	the	HIP.	
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The	Cases	
	
United	Kingdom:	West	Coast	Rail	Case	
In	the	United	Kingdom,	the	West	Coast	rail	franchise	bidding	process	had	to	be	abandoned	
in	2012	after	major	administrative	mistakes	were	made,	costing	taxpayers	millions	of	
pounds	and	leading	to	direct	criticism	of	the	Transport	Department.		Virgin	Rail	Group	–	the	
existing	operator	of	the	West	Coast	line	–	lost	the	tender	for	the	new	franchise	to	the	
preferred	bidder	FirstGroup	in	2012.		Within	months,	the	award	of	the	franchise	to	
FirstGroup	was	withdrawn	after	errors	were	found	in	how	the	Transport	Department	had	
run	the	process	(see	Jupe	2013).		The	PAC	instituted	an	inquiry	and	took	oral	evidence	on	13	
December	2012,	when	the	permanent	secretary	of	the	Department	of	Transport	and	the	
Director	General	(Corporate)	appeared	to	answer	for	the	alleged	mistakes	of	their	
department.		The	PAC	brought	down	its	final	report	in	February	2013.	
	
Political	Debates:	
On	several	occasions	during	the	oral	evidence,	questions	were	asked	about	how	much	the	
failure	of	the	franchising	process	could	be	related	to	the	cuts	imposed	on	the	Civil	Service	by	
the	Chancellor	George	Osborne.		Labour	MP	Fiona	Mactaggert	directed	a	question	on	the	
topic	to	the	permanent	secretary,	Philip	Rutnam:	
Q115	Fiona	Mactaggart:	Did	you	get	the	basics	wrong	because	you	were	told	that	
you	had	to	cut	spending—that	you	could	not	have	the	right	resources	to	do	this?	Is	
that	one	of	the	reasons	why	you	got	the	basics	wrong?	(House	of	Commons	2013:	Ev	
13)		
In	answer,	the	Secretary	would	only	acknowledge	that	resourcing	issues	contributed	to	a	
challenging	environment,	but	that	the	main	reasons	had	been	around	effective	
management	and	leadership	(House	of	Commons	2013:	Ev	13).			
The	issue	was	taken	up	again	later	during	the	hearing	by	Labour	MP	Austin	Mitchell,	
when	discussing	what	had	caused	confusion	over	which	senior	officer	in	the	Department	
had	been	responsible	for	the	project	during	a	crucial	three	month	period.		‘Is	that	anything	
to	do	with	the	heavy	turnover	of	staff,	because	of	the	requirement	to	cut	your	staff	down’	
(House	of	Commons	2013:	Ev	16)?		The	Committee	Chair,	Labour	MP	Margaret	Hodge,	
joined	the	exchange	by	asking:	‘Did	you	not	get	financial	advisers	because	of	the	cuts’	
(House	of	Commons	2013:	Ev	17)?		After	being	pressed,	Secretary	Rutnam	did	concede	that:	
‘The	environment	in	relation	to	using	external	advisers	after	the	election	was	clearly	to	
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avoid	them	if	you	can’	(House	of	Commons	2013:	Ev	17).		Satisfied	that	this	supported	his	
point,	Austin	Mitchell	thanked	him	for	his	answer	and	said:	‘Another	triumph	for	the	
Osborne	cuts,	it	seems	to	me’	(House	of	Commons	2013:	Ev	17).	
	
Ministerial	Responsibility	
The	question	of	ministerial	responsibility	for	the	bureaucratic	failings	of	the	department	was	
conspicuous	largely	by	its	absence,	and	at	no	point	in	the	discussion	was	it	suggested	that	it	
was	up	to	ministers	to	resign	or	accept	ultimate	responsibility	for	the	errors	that	had	been	
made.		The	Committee	was	focused	on	pursuing	the	nature	of	the	administrative	mistakes	
and	who	might	be	responsible	at	a	departmental	level.		There	was	some	discussion	of	
whether	the	department	had	in	fact	appropriately	briefed	ministers,	and	of	the	fact	that	the	
mistakes	had	caused	considerable	public	embarrassment	at	the	political	level.		Chair	
Margaret	Hodge	engaged	with	Director	General	(Corporate)	Claire	Moriarty	about	whether	
ministers	had	been	made	aware	of	all	the	details	they	should	have.	
Clare	Moriarty:	I	am	speaking	from	recollection	because	I	didn’t	see	the	submission	
at	the	time,	but	the	submission	was	similar	to	the	papers	that	came	to	the	Board	
Investment	and	Commercial	Committee.	From	recollection,	I	think	that	the	
information	about	the	relative	growth	in	the	bid	compared	with	the	achieved	growth	
in	recent	years	wasn’t	in	the	submission.	
Chair:	That	was	in?	
Clare	Moriarty:	That	wasn’t	in.	
Chair:	Was	not	in	or	was	in?	
Clare	Moriarty:	Was	not,	as	far	as	I	recall.	
Q34	Chair:	Goodness.	(House	of	Commons	2013:	Ev	4)	
	
Conservative	MP	Stewart	Jackson	pointed	out	later	in	the	hearing	that	ministers	had	
not	received	the	full	information	they	should	have	because	of	the	Department	Secretary’s	
exclusion	from	the	decision-making	process.		He	emphasised	that	ministers	had	suffered	
‘serious	reputational	damage’	by	being	left	‘out	of	the	loop’	(House	of	Commons	2013:	Ev	
14).		The	question	essentially	was	about	who	was	responsible	for	having	embarrassed	
ministers,	rather	than	whether	ministers	should	bear	ultimate	responsibility	for	the	
mistakes	made.	
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‘Blame	Games’	
Hood’s	characterization	of	the	‘blame	game’	as	it	relates	to	‘agency	strategies’	is	focused	on	
the	design	of	an	organization	in	such	a	way	that	it	makes	it	difficult	to	pin	down	blame	–	to	
provide	a	‘buck	stops	here’	sign	for	any	particular	desk	(Hood	2011:	67).		The	transcript	from	
the	West	Coast	rail	hearing	shows	that	some	such	‘agency	strategies’	were	in	evidence.		For	
example,	PAC	members	were	intrigued	by	arrangements	that	meant	that	no	one	Single	
Responsible	Owner	(SRO)	had	carriage	or	oversight	of	the	project	from	the	outset.		This	
resulted	in	a	period	of	confusion	when	it	was	not	clear	which	of	two	possible	SRO’s	was	in	
charge.		The	Department’s	Secretary	and	the	Committee	Chair	discussed	the	point	in	at	least	
one	exchange,	with	the	Chair	asking	Rutnam	whether	he	now	acknowledged	that	the	
internal	divided	responsibility	had	been	‘mad’.		When	pressed,	Rutnam	conceded	that	he	
did	not	‘intend	to	carry	on	with	that	structure	in	the	future’	(House	of	Commons	2013:	Ev.	
3).	
	 There	was	also	a	focus	from	the	Secretary	and	the	Director	General	(Corporate)	on	
collectivizing	responsibility	for	errors	across	the	multitude	of	bodies	within	the	department	
that	had	played	a	part	in	the	project.		These	included	the	‘Contract	Award	Committee’	and	
the	‘Board	Investment	and	Commercial	Committee’	(House	of	Commons	2013:	Ev	1),	legal	
officers,	and	mid-level	staff	who	were	‘trying	to	do	the	best	they	could’	(House	of	Commons	
2013:	Ev	16)	but	hadn’t	notified	their	superior	officers	in	time	of	the	challenges	being	faced.	
	
Media	Response	
Whilst	the	hearings	and	proceedings	of	the	parliament	are	of	course	a	matter	of	public	
record,	in	reality	the	impact	of	parliamentary	committee	hearings	on	public	debate	is	largely	
mediated	by	the	level	of	press	attention	that	they	attract.		During	the	course	of	the	oral	
hearings	before	the	PAC	on	13	December	2012,	newswire	services	filed	stories	on	the	
unfolding	evidence	of	the	overall	costs	to	the	taxpayer	of	government	failure.		For	example,	
the	Press	Association	National	Newswire	posted	a	story	under	the	headline	‘Franchise	Fiasco	
Bill	“Could	Grow”’,	quoting	the	permanent	secretary	of	the	Transport	Department,	Philip	
Rutnam,	as	saying	that	he	couldn’t	guarantee	that	there	wouldn’t	be	further	calls	on	the	
public	purse	(Woodman	2012).	The	story	described	‘stormy	scenes’	at	the	hearing.	
The	Times	also	reported	on	the	tenor	of	the	exchanges	between	the	witnesses	and	
MP’s	on	the	Committee	as	‘angry’	and	how	the	Department’s	leaders	had	‘admitted’	to	
financial	waste	and	getting	the	‘basics	wrong’	(Sherman	2012).		The	Daily	Telegraph	used	
Rutnam’s	words	in	its	headline,	writing	‘West	Coast	bid	civil	servants	“penny	wise	and	
pound	foolish”’	(Thomas	2012).		None	of	these	articles	linked	the	testimony	of	the	civil	
servants	back	to	the	ministerial	responsibility	of	the	appropriate	minister.		Rather,	the	focus	
of	coverage	was	on	the	evidence	of	the	civil	servants	in	their	own	right	as	accepting	the	
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blame	themselves	for	the	maladministration	of	this	particular	project.		It	was	a	debate	about	
public	administration	rather	than	a	debate	about	‘political’	responsibility.	
The	tenor	of	the	coverage	remained	the	same	when	the	PAC	published	its	report	into	
the	matter	on	26	February	2013.		For	example,	The	Guardian	described	the	report	as	saying	
‘…the	aborted	west	coast	franchise	award	was	down	to	a	"complete	lack	of	commonsense"	
from	"blinkered,	rushed"	senior	officials’	(Topham	2013).		The	Daily	Telegraph	also	placed	
civil	servants	front	and	centre,	writing	that	the	‘…PAC		report	is	more	critical	about	the	lack	
of	leadership	and	the	failure	of	civil	servants	to	learn	from	mistakes	in	other	projects’	
(Gribben	2013).		The	Daily	Mirror,	under	the	headline	‘LACK	OF	COMMON	SENSE	THAT	COST	
US	£50MILLION;	Fury	at	West	Coast	rail	farce’,	focussed	on	the	‘blinkered’	approach	of	civil	
servants,	and	quoted	a	union	leader	as	saying:	‘They	could	not	be	trusted	to	run	a	whelk	
stall	let	alone	multi-billion	pound	contracts’	(Ellis	2013).		In	Liverpool,	the	Echo	bucked	the	
trend	by	quoting	an	Opposition	MP	demanding	a	degree	of	ministerial	responsibility	for	
what	had	occurred,	suggesting	that	ministers	should	not	‘hide	behind	civil	servants’	
(Williamson	2013).		The	Financial	Times	(Odell	2013)	also	suggested	that	the	report	‘pointed	
the	finger	of	blame	at	ministers.’			
Overall,	the	majority	of	the	media	focus	was	on	the	alleged	incompetence	of	civil	
service	officials	rather	than	the	lack	of	appropriate	oversight	or	responsibility	from	
ministers.		Terms	such	as	‘blinkered’	and	‘lack	of	common	sense’	were	directed	not	at	
ministers	but	squarely	at	their	departmental	officials.		In	other	words,	media	coverage	very	
much	reflected	the	Committee’s	view	of	the	proceedings	rather	than	that	of	the	civil	
servants.		The	PAC,	through	its	lines	of	questioning,	provided	a	framing	narrative	for	what	
had	gone	wrong,	and	the	media	embraced	and	amplified	that	narrative.	
	
Australia:	Home	Insulation	Program	
	
In	Australia,	the	HIP	was	one	part	of	a	suite	of	fiscal	stimulus	measures	adopted	by	the	Rudd	
Government	in	response	to	the	onset	of	the	Global	Financial	Crisis.		Introduced	in	2009,	in	
broad	terms	the	scheme’s	stated	goals	were	to	stimulate	the	economy	by	providing	large	
rebates	to	Australians	willing	to	install	roof	insulation,	and	simultaneously	to	improve	
energy	efficiency	in	Australian	homes.		Failures	in	regulation	and	the	fast-paced	
implementation	of	the	scheme	were	widely	criticized	as	at	least	four	insulation	installers	lost	
their	lives	and	poor	installation	practices	led	to	house	fires	(see	Lewis	2012).		In	October	
2009,	the	Australian	Senate	Standing	Committee	on	the	Environment,	Communications	and	
the	Arts	set	up	an	inquiry	into	the	‘Energy	Efficient	Homes	Package’.		The	committee	took	
five	days	of	oral	evidence,	predominantly	in	Canberra,	and	questioned	at	length	the	public	
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servants	who	had	been	involved	with	the	design	and	implementation	of	the	scheme,	from	
across	a	broad	range	of	government	departments	and	agencies.	
Political	Debates	
There	was	a	consistent	relationship	throughout	the	Committee’s	hearings	between	lines	of	
questioning	and	the	political	elements	of	decision-making	by	ministers.		Committee	
members	were	willing	to	push	public	servants	for	details	and	opinions,	and	public	servants	
were	prepared	to	stand	their	ground	and	refuse	to	answer	if	they	felt	a	question	related	to	
matters	going	to	the	provision	of	advice	to	ministers.	For	example,	an	Assistant	Secretary	
from	the	Department	of	Prime	Minister	and	Cabinet	refused	to	answer	a	particular	question	
in	detail	‘given	the	traditions	around	cabinet	in	confidence	and	material	going	to	cabinet’	
(Official	Committee	Hansard	2010c:	75).	
	 On	some	occasions,	witnesses	were	unsuccessful	in	their	attempts	to	stand	their	
ground,	as	the	following	exchange	illustrates.	
Senator	BARNETT—When	did	you	first	become	aware	of	the	government’s	plan	to	
put	together	a	$41	million	rescue	package?	
Mr	Griew—I	think	the	question	you	are	asking	me	goes	to	the	provision	of	advice	
that	we	give	to	the	government—	
Senator	BARNETT—No,	with	respect—	
Senator	BIRMINGHAM—It	is	a	fairly	direct	question.	
Senator	BARNETT—Mr	Griew,	with	respect,	that	is	a	direct	breach	of	Senate	
standing	orders.	I	am	asking	you	for	the	date—not	the	advice	you	gave	to	the	
government,	the	cabinet	or	the	minister—when	you	first	became	aware	of	the	
government’s	plans	to	put	together	a	$41	million	rescue	package.	Can	you	answer	
that	question,	please?	(Official	Committee	Hansard	2010b:	43)	
The	witness	was	pressed	and	went	on	to	provide	an	answer.		In	a	second	instance,	Senator	
Barnett	accepted	that	the	witness	had	a	legitimate	right	not	to	answer	a	question	on	the	
policy	options	that	were	given	to	a	minister	because	of	the	accepted	convention	against	
revealing	policy	advice	(Official	Committee	Hansard	2010b:	45).	
	
Ministerial	Responsibility	
Whilst	seldom	explicitly	raised,	the	question	of	ministerial	responsibility	was	right	at	the	
heart	of	the	committee’s	concerns.		Their	sharpest	questioning	was	on	what	ministers	were	
told	and	when	and	how	they	responded.		The	Committee	was	probing	to	establish	whether	
any	conclusions	could	be	drawn	about	any	possible	dereliction	of	duty	–	either	by	relevant	
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ministers	or	the	prime	minister.		In	a	sense	they	were	looking	for	evidence	that	could	be	
used	politically	against	the	executive	rather	than	seeking	public	service	based	explanations	
for	alleged	administrative	incompetency.	
There	were	long	lines	of	questioning	regarding	a	risk	assessment	report	on	the	
program	that	had	been	prepared	by	external	consultants	Minter	Ellison,	and	when	and	if	
ministers	had	been	made	aware	of	the	contents	of	that	report	(see	Official	Committee	
Hansard	2010a,	4-42).		These	extended	into	questions	of	how	often	ministers	were	briefed,	
and	whether	ministers	had	been	proactive	in	asking	for	briefings.	
Senator	BIRMINGHAM—I	want	to	know	the	minister’s	response	to	this	now.	I	know	
you	have	continually	updated	him.	I	want	to	know	whether	he	just	sat	there	like	a	
mute	or	how	he	responded.	Did	he	ask	for	more	information?	(Official	Committee	
Hansard	2010a:	35)	
The	Committee	was	particularly	keen	to	establish	whether	there	had	been	any	ministerial	
level	directives	to	rush	program	implementation.	
Senator	BIRMINGHAM—What	instructions	about	deadlines	did	the	Prime	Minister	
or	Parliamentary	Secretary	Arbib	give	you	at	the	commencement	of	the	program?	
Mr	Mrdak—The	Prime	Minister	publicly	made	clear	at	the	time	the	urgency	of	
implementing	the	fiscal	stimulus	measures,	and	ministers	have	reiterated	that	
through	the	course	of	the	program.	The	time	frames	were	set	out	in	the	National	
Partnership	Agreement,	which	was	agreed	by	COAG,	as	Ms	Beauchamp	has	outlined,	
and	the	government	was	very	clear	about	the	time	frames	for	the	delivery	of	the	
program.	
Senator	BIRMINGHAM—Did	the	Prime	Minister	ever	tell	you	that	there	should	be	no	
change	to	any	of	the	announced	time	lines?	
Mr	Mrdak—No,	not	explicitly.	We	worked	through	the	time	frames	that	were	
provided	by	government	to	implement	the	program.	(Official	Committee	Hansard	
2010b:	10)	
		
Blame	Games	
The	apparent	focus	of	the	Senate	Committee	members	was	less	on	attributing	blame	to	
particular	departments	–	although	there	were	elements	of	that	–	but	to	finding	information	
with	which	they	could	sheet	home	political	blame	to	the	government	for	mistakes	made.		
Nevertheless,	in	providing	information	on	what	ministers	had	said	and	done	at	various	
times,	public	servants	also	exhibited	some	of	the	blame	avoidance	strategies	outlined	by	
Hood	(2011).		For	example,	there	were	frequent	clarifications	provided	about	the	fact	that	
13	
	
Dennis	C.	Grube	
	
different	officers	were	unable	to	comment	on	particular	things	because	they	had	changed	
position	since	the	events	in	question.		This	fits	broadly	within	the	‘agency	strategies’	
identified	by	Hood	that	enable	the	avoidance	of	blame	through	consistent	position	churn	
(Hood	2011:	19).		Senators	were	certainly	acutely	aware	of	the	issue,	as	the	following	
exchange	illustrates:	
Senator	BIRMINGHAM—I	assume	Mr	Hoffman	and	others	were	involved	on	a	day-
to-day	basis.	
Mr	Hoffman—Not	personally.	I	took	up	my	current	role	on	21	December.	
Senator	BIRMINGHAM—Okay.	That	is	always	convenient.	
Mr	Hoffman—It	is	just	a	fact.	
Senator	BIRMINGHAM—The	moving	sands	of	the	Public	Service.	A	couple	of	times	
today	we	have	hit	this	issue	of	changing	faces.	(Official	Committee	Hansard	2010c:	
83)	
	
Media	Response	
The	media	coverage	of	the	hearings	largely	followed	the	political	focus	of	much	of	the	
questioning.		The	overwhelming	focus	of	pieces	–	both	in	newspapers	and	on	television	
news	bulletins	–	was	on	Minister	Garrett	and	his	handling	of	matters,	including	the	Minter	
Ellison	report	which	the	Senate	Committee	was	portrayed	as	having	‘extracted’	from	
Minister	Garrett’s	Department	at	the	hearings.		Some	of	the	early	pieces	filed	on	the	same	
day	as	the	committee	evidence	was	being	heard	did	focus	more	heavily	on	the	actual	
evidence	being	presented	by	the	Departmental	Secretary	Robyn	Kruk.		The	ABC	filed	a	piece	
noting	the	Secretary’s	apology	to	the	families	of	installers	who	died	during	the	program	
(ABC	2010),	and	AAP	filed	a	piece	under	the	heading	‘Bureaucrats	kept	damning	report	from	
Garrett’	(Alexander	2010).	
The	second	day	of	hearings	(26	February)	saw	a	similar	range	of	pre-emptive	and	
then	evaluative	media	coverage.		On	26th	February,	AAP	carried	a	story	under	the	headline	
‘Top	PM	officials	to	front	Senate	insulation	inquiry’	and	introduced	the	Coordinator-General	
Glenys	Beauchamp	-	as	‘…the	bureaucrat	responsible	for	overseeing	the	government's	
economic	stimulus	rollout…’	and	that	she	‘…heads	the	list	of	public	servants	giving	evidence’	
(AAP	2010a).		The	following	day’s	newspaper	coverage	focused	on	the	demotion	of	the	
responsible	minister	–	Peter	Garret	–	with	a	re-shuffle	of	his	portfolio	responsibilities	
(Coorey	2010;	Breusch	2010).		The	Canberra	Times	reported	on	the	evidence	of	one	senior	
bureaucrat	-	Employment	and	Workplace	Relations	associate	secretary	Robert	Griew	–	in	
relation	to	whether	unions	had	expressed	safety	concerns	about	the	program.		But	once	
again,	the	focus	was	not	so	much	on	Griew	as	on	the	political	culpability	of	the	Rudd	
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Government	in	having	ignored	the	warnings	that	unions	insisted	had	been	given	(Beeby	
2010a).	
The	Committee’s	final	report	was	released	on	15	July,	and	its	call	for	a	royal	
commission	into	the	insulation	scheme	immediately	dominated	headlines.	For	example,	AAP	
began	one	piece	with	‘Environment	Protection	Minister	Peter	Garrett	has	dismissed	calls	for	
a	royal	commission	into	the	government's	botched	insulation	scheme	as	a	political	
campaign	by	the	opposition’	(AAP	2010b)	and	ABC	news	carried	a	story	headlined:	‘Senate	
urges	royal	commission	into	insulation	scheme’	(Kirk	2010).		The	following	day’s	newspapers	
also	focussed	on	the	political	dimension	of	the	call	for	a	royal	commission,	emphasising	
questions	of	political	responsibility	rather	than	departmental	or	bureaucratic	responsibility	
for	the	failures	and	shortcomings	of	the	scheme.			
The	Advertiser	quoted	Minister	Garrett	as	saying:	‘There's	nothing	new	that	has	
come	through	in	this	recommendation	that	hasn't	already	been	comprehensively	addressed	
by	the	government’	(Advertiser	2010).		In	Melbourne,	The	Age	ran	with	the	Opposition’s	
promise	to	hold	a	royal	commission	if	the	government	did	not,	and	quoted	the	Committee	
Chair’s	frustrations	at	departments	keeping	information	secret	and	ministers	not	appearing	
before	the	Committee	(Harrison	2010).		The	Canberra	Times	wrote:	‘A	Senate	inquiry	into	
the	bungled	$2.5billion	home	insulation	program	has	called	for	a	royal	commission	to	grill	
Prime	Minister	Julia	Gillard,	senior	ministers	and	top	bureaucrats	over	the	scheme's	''gross	
and	systematic	failures''’	(Beeby	2010b).	
In	summary,	in	the	Australian	case,	media	attention	was	strongly	focused	on	the	
political	rather	than	administrative	lessons	and	repercussions	to	flow	from	the	HIP.		Blame	
was	sheeted	home	to	ministers	rather	than	public	servants.		The	debates	over	the	report	
occurred	in	the	realm	of	political	point-scoring	rather	than	assessing	bureaucratic	
accountability	for	any	of	the	errors	made.		As	in	the	British	case,	this	suggests	that	the	
media	embraced	the	framing	narrative	of	the	majority	of	committee	members,	and	
amplified	that	story	through	press	headlines.		The	committee	had	focussed	on	who	should	
be	held	politically	responsible	and	the	media	followed	that	focus	and	framed	their	stories	
around	alleged	failings	of	political	leadership	rather	than	administrative	error	on	the	part	of	
public	servants.	
	
Significance:	The	Dramaturgy	of	Accountability	
The	two	case	studies	demonstrate	that	there	is	a	wide	spectrum	of	current	practice	in	the	
questioning	of	public	servants	by	parliamentary	committees	and	in	subsequent	press	
coverage.		In	the	Australian	case,	questioning	centred	on	what	ministers	knew	and	when	
and	how	they	responded	to	unfolding	events.		Questioning	of	public	service	witnesses	–	
whilst	leading	to	some	tense	exchanges	–	focused	on	identifying	which	ministers	could	or	
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should	be	held	politically	responsible	for	mistakes.		There	was	little	direct	criticism	of	public	
service	processes	as	opposed	to	political	outcomes.		The	Australian	media	largely	reflected	
that	focus	in	its	reporting.		Public	servants	were	not	directly	blamed	or	held	accountable,	
and	their	evidence	was	utilized	only	in	so	far	as	it	helped	to	shed	light	on	questions	of	
ministerial	responsibility.	
	 By	contrast,	in	the	United	Kingdom	case	the	focus	of	questioning	was	squarely	on	
administrative	structures	and	processes	and	how	they	contributed	to	the	failure	of	the	
tender	process.		Civil	servants	were	publicly	upbraided	by	MP’s	on	the	PAC,	with	little	
mention	of	their	ministerial	masters.		Press	reporting	followed	the	Committee’s	lead.		
Criticisms	–	clear,	sharp	and	personal	–	were	levelled	at	the	Transport	Department	and	its	
bureaucratic	leadership.		There	was	also	some	focus	on	how	a	further	repetition	of	such	
mistakes	in	the	future	could	be	avoided.		It	was	–	at	both	the	PAC	and	the	media	level	–	an	
exercise	in	administrative	rather	than	political	accountability.	
There	are	of	course	a	number	of	variables	that	could	be	contributing	to	this	result.		
In	the	United	Kingdom,	the	PAC	is	a	committee	with	a	long	tradition	of	fierce	and	largely	
non-partisan	scrutiny	of	government	departments.		In	Australia,	the	Senate	committee	
hearings	in	question	were	instituted	in	an	election	year	against	the	background	of	an	
opposition	narrative	criticizing	the	government	for	alleged	waste	and	undue	haste	in	the	
implementation	of	its	fiscal	stimulus	measures.		It	was	an	environment	in	which	fierce	
partisan	disagreement	over	the	home	insulation	program	dominated	political	debate.		The	
cost	in	terms	of	lives	lost	and	money	allegedly	misspent	had	already	been	heavily	covered	in	
the	media	before	the	committee’s	investigation,	setting	the	context	for	the	committee	to	
seek	to	attribute	political	blame	for	these	failures.		This	context	may	help	to	explain	the	
political	focus	of	the	questioning	as	against	the	administrative	focus	in	the	United	Kingdom	
example.	
In	terms	of	dramaturgy	theory,	the	committee	hearings	in	both	cases	can	be	said	to	
have	served	their	purpose.		They	were	set-piece	adversarial	plays	in	which	the	people’s	
democratically	elected	representatives	could	flex	their	muscle	against	non-elected	public	
servants.		They	created	clear	stories,	with	well-defined	‘heroes	and	villains	and	innocent	
victims’	(Stone	2002:	138)	for	public	consumption.		There	were	two	‘scripts’	(Hajer	2005a)	
that	the	committee	members	promulgated.		Script	one,	most	prevalent	in	the	Australian	
case,	positioned	ministers	as	the	guilty	parties	and	public	servants	as	proxies	being	used	to	
shield	their	political	masters.		Script	two,	most	clearly	in	evidence	in	the	United	Kingdom	
case,	positioned	civil	servants	as	the	guilty	party	that	had	to	be	disciplined	–	and	be	publicly	
seen	to	be	disciplined	–	by	the	elected	representatives	of	the	people.		It	was	civil	servants	
more	than	democratically	elected	ministers	that	were	presented	as	having	let	the	public	
down.		The	effect	of	the	committee	hearings	in	questioning	senior	bureaucrats	was	to	
embarrass	them	–	and	in	a	public	way.		By	doing	so	in	a	setting	of	adversarial	theatre,	MPs	
on	committees	were	facilitating	accountability	to	the	wider	electorate	–	through	the	
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amplifying	effect	of	the	media.		When	viewed	through	the	lens	of	dramaturgy	theory,	what	
on	the	surface	appears	to	be	an	exercise	in	public	servants	being	subjected	to	a	form	of	
direct	accountability	to	parliament	becomes	instead	a	public	act	of	penance	intended	for	a	
much	wider	audience.		
The	media	played	their	part	in	the	script	by	amplifying	the	idea	that	public	servants	
were	on	trial.		Terms	like	‘grilling’	and	‘fiasco’	were	liberally	dotted	through	the	media	
coverage	in	the	United	Kingdom,	with	the	judgmental	words	of	MPs	quoted	with	approval.		
The	committee	reports	in	both	cases	also	provided	the	certainty	of	a	‘judgment’	–	a	finding	
on	who	should	be	‘blamed’	for	what	had	occurred.		The	blame	avoidance	strategies	
identified	by	Hood	(2011)	were	certainly	prevalent,	and	were	to	some	extent	successful	in	
dispersing	blame	as	widely	as	possible.		In	the	United	Kingdom	case,	the	blame	landed	on	
the	collective	desks	of	the	civil	servants	leading	the	Transport	Department.		In	the	Australian	
case	it	settled	on	the	shoulders	of	the	political	executive,	but	did	so	via	the	shoulders	of	
public	service	leaders	having	to	soak	up	the	Senate’s	anger	first.		Further	media	studies	in	
the	future	will	help	to	reveal	whether	media	coverage	of	public	servants	appearing	before	
parliamentary	committees	has	changed	over	time,	and	whether	this	has	effected	public	
perceptions	of	the	degree	to	which	public	servants	should	be	held	accountable.	
In	both	cases,	rightly	understanding	the	nature	of	the	‘setting’,	public	servants	
adopted	blame	avoidance	strategies	to	defend	themselves	and	their	departments	from	the	
fierce	criticism	of	committee	members.		All	three	of	Hood’s	blame	avoidance	techniques	–	
presentational,	agency	and	policy	strategies	–	were	in	evidence	at	various	points	across	the	
two	cases.		As	the	designated	‘villains’	of	the	piece,	and	on	the	wrong	end	of	a	power	
imbalance	in	the	setting	of	a	committee	hearing,	public	servants	reacted	by	protecting	
themselves	as	best	they	could	without	compromising	their	responsible	minister.		Earlier	
work	by	Sulitzeanu-Kenan	(2010)	examining	commissions	of	inquiry	after	crisis	events	
suggests	that	commissions	of	inquiry	are	not	actually	the	most	effective	vehicles	for	
encouraging	‘learning’	because	of	the	emphasis	on	finding	out	who	is	to	‘blame’.		The	
evidence	examined	in	this	paper	suggests	that	the	same	criticism	can	be	made	of	the	
appearance	of	public	servants	before	parliamentary	committees.	
The	cases	examined	reveal	the	underlying	strengths	and	weaknesses	of	engaging	
public	servants	in	a	public	form	of	parliamentary	accountability	as	part	of	the	theatre	of	
government.		At	one	level,	the	approach	in	the	United	Kingdom	case	will	arguably	lead	the	
Transport	Department	to	re-double	its	efforts	to	avoid	the	embarrassment	that	would	
accompany	any	repetition	of	past	mistakes.		But	in	doing	so,	the	department	and	its	leaders	
have	had	to	shoulder	the	bulk	of	the	accountability	for	errors	that	under	conventions	of	
ministerial	accountability	really	belonged	to	their	democratically	elected	leaders.		Amidst	
calls	for	bureaucratic	heads	to	roll	after	administrative	failures	it	is	easy	to	lose	sight	of	the	
importance	of	Westminster	conventions	on	where	responsibility	ultimately	resides.	
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	 In	the	Australian	case,	the	focus	by	the	Senate	and	the	press	on	political	
accountability	upholds	the	traditional	conventions	of	ministerial	responsibility.		But	in	doing	
so	through	the	questioning	of	public	servants	rather	than	ministers,	the	process	draws	
public	servants	into	what	are	largely	political	rather	than	administrative	debates.		The	
Committee	expressed	frustration	in	its	final	report	that	the	people	it	had	really	wanted	to	
question	were	the	ministers	who	had	refused	to	appear.		Public	servants	were	essentially	
acting	as	proxies	to	soak	up	the	political	blame	intended	for	their	democratically	elected	
superiors.		What	the	process	shows	is	not	so	much	the	strengths	of	the	parliamentary	
scrutiny	of	public	servants,	but	rather	the	weaknesses	of	parliamentary	scrutiny	of	
ministers.	
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